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Abstract 
This study reviews the liquidity costs for firms in outlying regions in primary listing on a 
centralized stock exchange. Using a unique hand-collected sample comprising all listed firms 
from across West Africa we find evidence that firms from outlying regions do have higher 
illiquidity costs although these can be mitigated from improvements in transparency that are 
associated with increasing familiarity amongst investment community of central exchange. 
This evidence has implications regarding the integration of stock exchanges in developing 
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1.  Introduction 
The worldwide wave of mergers of national stock exchanges that has resulted in formation of 
agglomerated entities such as Euronext in Europe and Scandinavia has been largely motivated 
by notions of cost reduction through exploitation of economies of scale and scope in the 
provision of trading and related support activities that leads to enhanced competitiveness of 
these integrated markets in attracting ever increasingly footloose global investment capital.  
Similar arguments regarding increased scale and scope efficiencies in exchange operations 
leading to competitive attraction of otherwise scarce global investment capital have 
underscored the formation of integrated regional capital markets in the developing world.  
One example is the 1998 extension of the existing capital market in Cote d’Ivoire to all other 
member states of the Francophone UMEAO1 region in West Africa through the establishment 
of regional BRVM2.  However more recently the Anglophone markets of Ghana and Nigeria 
have developed an increasingly regional orientation through the attraction of primary listings 
of firms in neighbouring countries.  Consequently we ask whether stock exchanges adopting a 
strong regional focus can provide effective liquidity to firms listing from more distant 
outlying regions or nations within an integrated framework. 
 The nascent literature on implications of regional capital markets in acting as a source 
of sustainable finance and liquidity to firms from more distant regions in a centralised 
marketplace is centred in three distinct strands.  The first is rooted in economic geography 
literature where Klagge and Martin (2005) introduce notions of a lack of spatial-neutrality 
which is particularly prevalent in centralised capital markets leading to a funding gap and 
rationing of both credit and equity to firms located in more distant provinces.  The second 
                                                 
1
 The Francophone West African Economic and Monetary Union (also known Union Monétaire et Économique 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (UMEAO)) countries include Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Guinea-Bissau 
2
 La Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM) is a regional stock exchange established in 1998 in place 
of the former national Bourse d’Abidjan and is based in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire.  Antennae de bourse offices 
have been established in capital cities of all eight UMEAO member states to assist in technical aspects of trading 
and promoting centralised market while a separate network of Societe de Gestion et d'Intermédiation (SGI) or 
licensed brokers precipitates order flow 
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focusses on the study by Loughran and Schulz (2005) contrasting liquidity of urban as 
opposed to rural based firms within largely centralised capital market of United States.  The 
findings attribute the significantly higher liquidity of urban stocks over their rural 
counterparts through greater familiarity of urban stocks to institutional investors that are 
predominantly urban-based as well as their enhanced information access to urban-based firms.  
The third and final strand of literature relates to informational access differentials between 
local as opposed to foreign analysts.  Bae et al (2008) find evidence from study of local and 
foreign analysts across 32 countries that the former produce more accurate earnings forecasts 
and that locally-based analysts are especially important in institutionally deficient 
environments where there is less disclosure and greater earnings smoothing.  Consequently 
our first theoretically based contribution to literature is in undertaking a unique assessment of 
the impact of regional primary listings in terms of their liquidity-based transactions costs 
which captures the dynamics of informational asymmetry. 
 West Africa’s formal business environment is largely dominated by listed firms made 
up from former state owned enterprises (SOEs) as well as locally incorporated subsidiaries of 
foreign (mostly European) multinational enterprises (MNEs).  However a unique nuance of 
the region is the recent emergence of local indigenous emerging MNE firms such as the 
Moroccan-Malian Bank of Africa and Togolese Ecobank.  These have engaged in rapid 
expansions across Africa and Middle East through the very recently reported phenomenon of 
south-south foreign direct investment (FDI) (see Sun et al (2010) and Liu et al (2011) for 
discussions on south-south FDI emanating from India and China respectively) while the 
external funding and regulatory capital requirements of their subsidiaries is reliant on primary 
and joint-primary listings across West Africa’s nascent stock markets.  As such our study 
provides a unique insight into the informational asymmetries present across integrated 
regional markets such as BRVM as well as regionally focussed markets such as Ghana and 
Nigeria that underscore liquidity-based transactions costs incurred by large well known firms 
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from distant outlying regions on centralized exchanges.  This is particularly pertinent in the 
case of Togolese Ecobank with unique joint-primary listing between BRVM, Ghana and 
Nigeria where all have common composition of senior management and boards of directors as 
well as the Burkina Faso, Niger and Benin subsidiaries of Bank of Africa. 
 The literature regarding liquidity within Africa’s capital markets primarily focusses on 
the attribution of pricing premiums to liquidity in size and liquidity factor augmented 
variations of the capital asset pricing model.  Hearn and Piesse (2009) find evidence of size 
and liquidity premiums across a broad sample of African listed industrial sectors while Hearn 
et al (2010) find similar evidence from a smaller sample comprised of Egypt, Morocco, 
Kenya and South Africa.  Finally Hearn and Piesse (2010) find evidence of both size and 
liquidity in stock pricing across a sample of West African markets alongside Tunisia, 
Morocco, UK and France while the time-varying nature of liquidity coefficient betas have 
been explored across Africa including BRVM and Nigeria by Hearn (2012).  More recently 
Hearn and Piesse (2013) undertake a unique study across Sub Saharan African (SSA) region 
comparing the robustness of three low frequency liquidity measures in explaining total trading 
costs measure, formed from combination of bid-ask spread and brokerage commissions 
associated with a round trip (respective buy and sell legs) trade.  This included BRVM, Ghana 
and Nigeria alongside a further nine SSA equity markets and found that Lesmond, Ogden and 
Trzcinska (1999), henceforth LOT, proportion of daily zero returns indicator and to a lesser 
extent the multidimensional liquidity measure introduced by Liu (2006) are closely associated 
with total trading costs.  The Hearn and Piesse (2013) study also introduced a unique series of 
controls to account for the impact on liquidity and transactions costs arising from the 
involvement of state, foreign partners, retained entrepreneurial founders, domestic and foreign 
venture capitalists within focal firm’s organizational structure and ownership and finally 
whether firm is part of an extended family network or business group.  Consequently the 
second contribution to the literature from our study is in the study of the contrasting impact of 
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regional listings on liquidity within a unique regional equity market setting of BRVM as well 
as Ghana and Nigeria in West African developing region. 
 Our maintained hypothesis is that liquidity-based transactions costs are higher for 
firms in outlying regions listing on a centralised stock exchange.  However we also find 
evidence of a contrasting impact on liquidity related to the degree of economic and financial 
integration of the region and the location of the central stock exchange.  We also find that 
firm’s association with an extended family network or business group infers higher liquidity 
while involvement of state, foreign partner and foreign venture capitalists generally infer 
lower liquidity. 
 We proceed as follows: the next section reviews theoretical antecedents behind 
principal low-frequency liquidity measures and outlines their construction.  It also outlines the 
literature behind regional markets as well as the firm governance and market controls 
alongside a newly introduced control accounting for impact of civil war on liquidity and 
transactions costs.  Section 3 outlines data, sample construction and details the West African 
business and institutional environment while section 4 details empirical methods.  Section 5 
discusses results and the final section concludes. 
 
2.  The regional and governance Determinants of Liquidity 
2.1.  Dependent variables:  Liquidity benchmarks 
There has been considerable evolution in liquidity measures during the last decade although 
one measure, the bid-ask spread (Jain, 2002), is generally used in literature as a low-frequency 
liquidity benchmark.  However a serious limitation arises when closing prices deviate from 
the official bid and ask price quotes given that trades take place at different prices or even 
outside the quotes (Lesmond, 2005).  This is a particularly important issue in markets in West 
Africa, such as in Ghana where pre-agreed details are often registered in trading sessions 
following transactions undertaken outside of the formal exchange (Akotey, 2009).  More 
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recently evidence from Hearn and Piesse (2013) reveals that there are significant issues 
regarding the wholesale lack of definition of certain measures in the presence of severe 
illiquidity across Africa’s emerging and frontier markets.  In particular Amihud (2002) price 
impact and ubiquitous turnover measures are routinely undefined across African markets and 
thus have been omitted from our study despite their prevalence in the literature that focusses 
on large developed markets such as US.  Consequently we use three principal liquidity 
measures as our dependent variables in assessing liquidity-based transactions costs: the bid-
ask spread, the multidimensional Liu indicator, and LOT (1999) proportion of zero returns. 
 
2.1.1. The bid ask spread 
The bid-ask spread is the average of the available monthly quotes with a minimum of a single 
month’s quote for that month and the average used for the spread, which minimizes outliers 
that result from monthly sampling.  Finally, following Lesmond (2005) negative bid-ask 
spreads and those that exceed 80% are removed.  The monthly quoted spread is defined as: 
            2/2/2/1 11 11 MM MMMM MMM BidAsk BidAskBidAsk BidAskspreadQuoted     (1) 
 
2.1.2. LOT (1999) Proportion of zero daily returns measure 
The proportion of daily zero returns over a period of the total number of trading days in a 
month is based on the measure introduced by Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), or LOT 
(1999).  It is calculated on a stock-by-stock basis using: 
 nDM turnDailyZeroD 1 Re1          (2) 
where MD  is the number of days in the month, M. 
 
2.1.3. Liu (2006) measure 
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This follows Liu (2006) and is defined as LMx which is the standardized turnover-adjusted 
number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior x months (x = 1, 6, 12), that is: 
xLM  =  months-prior xin  mesdaily volu ofNumber  +  Deflatorturnovermonthx1  
  NoTDx21           (3) 
where x_month_turnover is the turnover over the prior x months, calculated as the sum of the 
daily turnover over the prior x months, daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares 
traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of the day, NoTD is the total 
number of trading days in the market over the prior x months, and Deflator is chosen such that, 
  110 
Deflator
turnovermonthx
          (4) 
for all sample stocks3.  Given the turnover adjustment (the second term in brackets in (3)), 
two stocks with the same integer number of zero daily trading volumes can be distinguished: 
the one with the larger turnover is more liquid.  Thus the turnover adjustment acts as a tie-
breaker when sorting stocks based on the number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 
x months.  Because the number of trading days can vary from 15 to 23, multiplication by the 
factor (21x/ NoTD) standardizes the number of trading days in a month to 21, which makes 
the liquidity measure comparable over time.  LM1 can be interpreted as the turnover-adjusted 
number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior month.  The liquidity measure, LMx is 
calculated at the end of each month for each individual stock based on daily data. 
 
2.2  West African regional market variables 
The literature relating to the differential impact between local as opposed to foreign (or more 
distant regional) firms and their respective analyst coverage alludes to elevated ownership in 
firms by mutual fund managers and investors that are local to them (Ivkovic and Weisbenner 
(2005) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Frieder and Subrahanyam (2005)).  In line with 
                                                 
3
 Following Liu (2006) a deflator of 11,000 is used in constructing estimates for LM1 
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this evidence regarding home bias in ownership, Loughran and Schultz (2004) find similar 
evidence relating to trading concentration in local stocks.  Two principal explanations have 
been put forward by literature to explain bias in ownership and trading activity towards stocks 
and firms local to mutual fund managers and investors. 
The first relates to an informational advantage of local analysts and investors.  Malloy 
(2004) finds analysts local to firms provide more accurate earnings forecasts which is 
particularly prevalent for firms located in remote areas, as well as those of smaller size and 
with higher accounting book value to market value ratios.  Loughran and Schultz (2005) argue 
that more distantly located analysts are at a distinct disadvantage to their local counterparts 
owing to travel times and a lack of familiarity with nuances of local environment.  These 
issues in effect amount to a form of transactions costs in terms of search and verification costs 
encountered by non-local analysts.  Bae et al (2008) similarly find that local analysts are at a 
distinct advantage in information production in contrast to their foreign counterparts across a 
sample of 32 countries.  However their advantage is especially significant in countries where 
smoothing of earnings is more commonplace and there is greater paucity in disclosure. 
The second explanation relates to familiarity.  Using US sample sets Barber and 
Odean (2003) and Huberman (2001) all find consistent evidence of local biases in stock 
ownership and trading activity caused by enhanced exposure and familiarity with awareness.  
However Grullon et al (2004) extend these findings with evidence that local familiarity biases 
can be overcome through increased advertising and brand awareness campaigns by more 
distantly located companies.  Frieder and Subrahanyam (2005) find evidence that individual 
investors disproportionately hold firms with greater brand visibility.  This is particularly 
pertinent in West African context given the negligible institutional investor participation 
within the regions markets with indigenous investment communities being primarily 
composed of local finance houses and individual investors from either wealthy social elites or 
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overseas diaspora (see Hearn and Piesse (2010) for discussion of Malian investment 
community). 
To date, only three markets in Africa have successfully adopted integrated trading 
platforms:  Egypt between Cairo and Alexandria (Hearn, 2011), South Africa and Namibia 
(Hearn and Piesse (2012a, b) and the West African Francophone regional bourse (BRVM) 
located in Cote d’Ivoire (Hearn and Piesse, 2010).  All three have shared macroeconomic and 
governance arrangements through membership of various currency unions.  However 
capitalization and traded value on the regional BRVM has largely been dominated by a single 
stock, namely the Senegalese telecommunications operator, Sonatel, since inception in 1998 
(Hearn and Piesse, 2010).  More recently however the exchange has undergone a drive to 
increase its regional focus through the attraction of Bank of Africa Benin and Niger entities in 
2002 and 2003, Onatel, the Burkina Faso telecommunications operator in 2009, and Bank of 
Africa Burkina Faso entity in 2010 (Hearn, 2010, 2012a, b).  Generally there are far fewer 
regional foreign primary listings on the Ghanaian and Nigerian exchanges.  However the 
attraction of The Gambia’s Trust Bank entity to the Ghanaian market in 2006 is a notable 
exception alongside the joint-triple primary listing of Togolese Ecobank between BRVM, 
Ghana and Nigeria in 2007 (Hearn, 2012a,b).  Overall this evidence indicates that the regional 
attraction of listings is growing in importance for the Anglophone West African stock 
exchanges of Ghana and Nigeria while it is underscored by considerable political impetus as 
well as advanced level of monetary and economic integration in Francophone UMEAO region 
in case of BRVM.  However given the significance of evidence relating to local biases in 
ownership and trading activity as well as locally induced informational asymmetries we 
hypothesize that liquidity-based transactions costs should be positively related with more 
geographically distant regions.  Thus we would expect firms from more distant regions and 
nations to be positively associated with increased asymmetric information and illiquidity. 
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2.3  Control variables 
2.3.1. Firm governance controls 
Following the recent study of Hearn and Piesse (2013) we use a series of dummy (1/0) 
controls to account for distinctive types of ownership and governance arrangements.  These 
are the involvement of state or related government agencies, a long-term foreign partner, the 
maintained presence of an entrepreneur-founder on the board, the involvement of domestic or 
foreign venture capital and finally whether firm is affiliated to the extended network of family 
or business group.  The employment of dummy controls mitigates concerns over potential 
endogeneity relationship between level of actual ownership by various entities and liquidity or 
spreads.  Equally their employment is necessitated by often erratic availability of annual 
reports (see African Financials (2012)) as well as considerable variation in the quality of 
reporting ownership across national regulatory regimes (Hearn, 2013). 
 In particular motivation for the use of state and long-term foreign partner governance 
dummy controls arises from phased privatization which is especially common across West 
African region where it is notable that a particular peculiarity associated with nation states 
that are members of both Francophone UMEAO and CEMAC 4  economic and monetary 
unions is the dirigiste (state-led) capitalist model of development (Lavelle (2001); Hearn 
(2013)).  This when combined with civil code legal, political and governance systems that 
promote central authority of state and executive are also more commonly associated with full 
divestment of state ownership to a strategic foreign partner (Hearn; 2012, 2013) which is 
more prevalent in privatizations in civil code as opposed to common law markets.  This 
difference between civil and common law markets, largely underscored by the dirigiste 
economic model, has also been attributed to the general lack of entrepreneurial firms in 
                                                 
4
 La Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) is the second continental Franc-
zone which is centred in central Africa and includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.  Two stock exchanges serve this community: in Douala, Cameroon and 
Libreville, Gabon.  The attraction of listings has been a major issue for both exchanges with the Cameroonian 
bourse failing to attract any listings for first three years of its establishment while the Gabon-based exchange still 
lacks any listed firms or instruments 
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listings in the stock markets in civil code law markets (Bennell, 1997).  Hearn and Piesse 
(2013) also find little involvement of entrepreneur-founders in listed firms across SSA region 
although their presence does impart a significant impact on liquidity.  Hearn and Piesse (2013) 
also find considerable evidence of the pervasive presence of extended informal business 
groups and family networks.  Figure 1 exemplifies the complexity of tracing extended family 
and business networks with the example of the Bank of Africa business group which is 
ultimately owned by Moroccan BMCE bank, itself owned by Benjelloun family. 
Figure 1 
 
2.3.2. Institutional Controls:  Impact of civil war in Cote d’Ivoire 
Schneider and Troeger (2006) highlight that while there is a considerable literature on the 
economic causes and consequences of armed conflicts and war, relatively little is known 
about the actual costs of war and conflict.  Few, if any studies have focussed on the impact of 
domestic conflict, or civil war, on domestic capital markets. 
 
2.3.3. Market Controls 
The principal controls in liquidity based models are centred on notion of liquidity being 
reflective of the price for immediacy in trading demanded by active traders to passive market 
maker entities that face order processing and inventory risks.  As such Stoll (2000) outlines 
market controls of stock price, return volatility or variance, traded volume and market 
capitalization.  Price controls for discreteness and acts as an additional proxy for risk as low 
stocks tend to be riskier while increases in volume, number of trades and firm size (market 
capitalization) all increase the probability of locating a counterparty and thus are associated 
with reducing inventory risk.  Additionally the stocks return variance measures the risk of 
adverse price changes on stocks placed in inventory. 
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3.  Data 
3.1  Data and sample selection 
In order to estimate our liquidity benchmark, the bid-ask spread plus brokerage commissions 
we procure the end of day bid and ask quotes for Nigeria from Bloomberg while those for 
BRVM and Ghana are obtained direct from national stock exchanges.  It is notable in the case 
of BRVM that bid and ask prices are only disseminated in daily trading reports and through 
no other means.  As such these must be systematically collected, compiled and formed into a 
database prior to any further work.  Equally the bid and ask prices are effective (not quoted) 
in the light that the BRVM operates a call auction trading system and quoted spreads do not 
drive the market.  Historical time series bid and ask quotes are unavailable from Cape Verde 
exchange.  In all cases sample data ends in June 2012, while there is a considerable difference 
in historical availability of data and thus the starting date varies.  For BRVM (Cote d’Ivoire) 
from September 1998; for Ghana from July 2007 and for Nigeria from October 2009. 
 The computation of our individual liquidity estimators involved obtaining daily 
closing stock price data in local currency form from: Bloomberg for Nigeria and Ghana; and 
national stock exchanges in case of BRVM and Cape Verde Islands.  Local stock prices are 
used in estimation of LOT (1999) daily zero returns.  Finally in order to compute turnover, 
Amihud and Liu measures, daily trading volume and total numbers of shares outstanding data 
were sourced from Bloomberg and national stock exchanges.  It should be noted that the 
shares-outstanding is determined at the start of the year and remains constant for the 12 
months thereafter. 
 The primary source of firm governance and ownership characteristics in the first 
instance was the African Financials website (African Financials, 2012) in the light of patchy 
coverage at best of West African region in databases such as Bloomberg and Datastream.  
African Financials provides a dissemination service of annual reports and stock exchange 
filings for a relatively comprehensive sample of markets across Sub Saharan African and 
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West African regions although a notable exception is the BRVM.  However in many cases the 
database is incomplete in its holdings of annual reports for individual listed firms and in these 
cases individual firm websites in conjunction with regulatory authorities and national stock 
exchanges were used to additionally supplement data.  A further limitation is the opacity in 
reporting accurate ownership in annual reports, with this being attributed to general nominee 
accounts or omitted altogether.  This both necessitated the consultation of additional sources 
as well as the employment of simple dummy variable (1/0) in representing involvement of six 
various corporate and state entities in listed firm’s ownership and organizational structure as 
opposed to reporting share ownership levels.  This is very similar to the firm governance 
constructs developed and used in Hearn and Piesse (2013) across the wider Sub Saharan 
African region. 
 The regional listings dummy variables (1/0) are formed from whether listed firm’s 
head office and operations are based in another country within the wider West African region.  
This is particularly pertinent in case of BRVM where exchange itself was established to serve 
member states across the wider predominantly Francophone UMEAO economic and 
monetary union.  Notable regional equity listings on BRVM are from Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Niger and Benin while the Togolese MNE conglomerate of Ecobank is notable in its joint-
primary listing across BRVM, Ghanaian and Nigerian exchanges.  Gambia’s Trust Bank is the 
only other notable regional listing to have been undertaken on the Anglophone Ghanaian 
exchange. 
 Finally we introduce a dummy (1/0) variable to account for the period of civil war in 
Cote d’Ivoire which is from the point of disputed elections in December 2010 to the 
termination of formal hostilities in May 2011.  It is especially important to use a dummy 
rather than simple political risk measures as the BRVM was temporarily relocated to the 
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relative stability of Bamako, Mali for much of this period where limited trading and 
operations continued5. 
 
3.2.  West African business and governance environment 
A significant feature of the West African region is a general paucity in institutional quality 
inhibiting external contracting.  This is exemplified in Appendix Table 1 where the evidence 
reveals substantial deficiencies in codified corporate law as well as in corporate governance 
legislation and bodies that in combination exert a substantial impact on the quality of 
information production.  In particular the slow ratification of legal codes and statutes through 
parliament in Sierra Leone and Cape Verde infers a whole sale lack of protection of minority 
investors.  Further complications exist with bifurcated accounting and auditing systems within 
Nigeria where local accounting standards are used alongside their internationally recognized 
equivalent while only 40% of all Nigerian firms were deemed to have adopted any corporate 
governance measures in 2006 (CBN, 2006).  The regions stock exchanges are generally very 
small and reinforced by an often embryonic community of licensed brokers with few, if any 
market makers as is the case in Sierra Leone, Cape Verde, Cameroon, and BRVM itself.  
Partly as a response to these deficiencies exchanges have resorted to the attraction of listings 
of corporate and government debt instruments, such as bonds and treasuries, in order to retain 
economic viability.  This is exemplified by Cape Verdean exchange, with details outlined in 
Table 1, where firms are attracted to list debt through competitive tax breaks of up to 50% 
reduction in corporate taxation rates which has led to the capitalization of listed corporate 
debt being almost six times that of equity.  However the evidence from Table 1 also reveals 
characteristics in the operation of the Cape Verdean exchange common to the wider West 
African region such as concentration of trading activity in small handfuls of stocks and very 
                                                 
5
 BRVM operations were moved to Bamako, Mali in order to circumvent international sanctions placed on Cote 
d’Ivoire and specifically the former incumbent Gbagbo regime which caused many international banks to 
suspend or cede their operations owing to severity of foreign exchange controls.  Furthermore the military 
occupation of BRVM premises by Gbagbo supporters forced the suspension of operations underscoring the need 
for temporary relocation to Mali 
 15 
long order matching times that are occasionally as high as 24 days.  This severity in absence 
of liquidity further underscores our choice of low frequency liquidity measures. 
Table 1 
 
The evidence from Table 2 reveals characteristics of the West African business environment 
and governance arrangements.  It is notable that extended family networks dominate listed 
firms in Nigeria.  These alone account for over 42% of total exchange capitalization and over 
28% of traded value.  Equally extended family networks account for all listed capital and 
trading activity on embryonic Cameroonian exchange although this is based on large foreign 
(Luxembourg-based) family interests.  Family interests account for minimal proportions of 
listed capitalization and traded value in Ghana and even less in BRVM, although in this latter 
market this is solely represented by the extended network of Bank of Africa (as outlined 
earlier in Figure 1).  More generally state involvement is particularly high in the smaller 
markets of Cape Verde, Cameroon and Sierra Leone while foreign partner involvement is 
either non-existent or negligible between Sierra Leone and Nigeria yet highly prevalent in 
BRVM, Ghana and Cameroon.  Entrepreneurial firms account for a minimal proportion of 
listings across the region with only 24.18% of firms in Nigeria and 13.64% of firms in Ghana 
respectively.  This is equally reflective of a undercapitalized and almost non-existent 
entrepreneurial private sector in civil code law as opposed to common law countries across 
region (Bennell, 1997).  Similarly there is almost non-existent participation of domestic 
venture capitalists in region with sole exception of their involvement in 4.95% of Nigerian 
listed firms.  However in contrast there is a marked participatory involvement of foreign 
venture capitalists which is largely the result of private equity investment activity by 
international financial institutions such as IFC (US), CDC (UK) and Actis (UK).  However it 
is notable that the foreign venture capitalist involvement in Cape Verdean bank, Caixa 
Económica de Cabo Verde, is through Geocapital, a Macau-based private equity venture 
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formed by Hong Kong and Macau property magnate Stanley Ho and Macanese-Portuguese 
Jorge Ferro Ribiero (Geocapital, 2013).  This Chinese-backed venture aims to consolidate the 
provision of financial services across Portuguese-speaking countries world-wide thereby 
acting to facilitate trade with China (Geocapital, 2013). 
Table 2 
 
A unique feature of the West African business environment is the emergence of two large 
indigenous banking MNE firms, Ecobank and Bank of Africa, engaging in rapid expansion 
across African emerging market region.  Little, if any, literature exists on SSA south-south 
FDI underscoring the uniqueness of the expansion of both West African entities across the 
wider continent as detailed in Figure 2.  However there are notable differences between these 
two rival conglomerates underscoring their expansion.  In particular Ecobank has a more 
formalised structure based on that typical to a MNE while its rival Bank of Africa is 
structured more on an extended family or business network.  Control across otherwise 
disparate entities across Africa is exerted through an elaborate system of cross-shareholdings 
between entities (see Figure 1) and directors have shared local directorships across separate 
individual group entities.  Regionally distinct entities from both banking groups benefit from 
direct private equity involvement of PROPARCO (controlled by Agence Française de 
Développement), Netherlands development bank, FMO, and Belgian development finance 
entity, BIO.  Access to private equity finance alongside the benefits arising from optimal 
coordinative power over resources attributed to membership of extended business group have 
enabled both banking groups to engage in rapid recent expansions across the African 
continent as is evidence from Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
 
4.  Empirical Methods 
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In order to examine the relationship between our three designated liquidity measures, namely 
the bid-ask spread, multidimensional Liu (2006) indicator and LOT (1999) proportion of daily 
zero returns measure, and various dummy controls to account for firm governance, regional 
and civil war characteristics in addition to Stoll (2000) market controls we use pooled cross-
sectional and time series data.  We also use a series of industry dummy controls that account 
for potential variations of liquidity across industry sectors.  These are based on Bloomberg 
industry definitions and vary in absolute number depending on how many industries are 
represented in the smaller West African markets.  Following Lesmond (2005), Chung et al 
(2010) and Hearn and Piesse (2013) we use OLS regressions while owing to persistence in 
liquidity measures over time (see Agarwal (2011) for extended discussion) we have estimated 
the standard errors by clustering them on time dimensions using White cross section robust 
standard errors and covariances method.  This ensures that inference, based on standard errors, 
is robust to correlation across residuals within a firm over time6. 
 
5.  Results and discussion 
5.1  Descriptive statistics 
The evidence from Table 3 reveals characteristics of West Africa’s equity markets and their 
regional focus as well as providing motivation for sample selection for inclusion in empirical 
modelling.  There are some notable observations from descriptive statistics in Table 3.  The 
first is the relative inactivity and extremely high levels of illiquidity across all West African 
equity markets.  This is exemplified in proportions of daily zero returns in excess of 90% for 
both the BRVM and the Ghanaian market while this ratio of inactivity ascends to over 93% 
for the smaller markets of Cameroon, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone.  Generally bid-ask 
spreads are reflective of this level of inactivity in being in excess of 14% in Ghana to over 6% 
in BRVM where bid and ask prices are representative in the light that trading system is a call 
                                                 
6
 White cross section robust standard errors and covariances  method has been used in all estimations to account 
for period clustering over time for either firms or countries/markets 
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auction.  However the very low bid-ask spreads in Nigeria alongside very high proportion of 
daily zero returns measure (over 80% across Nigerian market) infers that significant caution 
should be taken in interpreting bid-ask spread metrics in this market.  More generally and the 
very small sample size and lack of time series underscores the omission from further study of 
Cameroon and Sierra Leone.  Similarly the lack of bid-ask spread data from Cape Verde 
underscores the omission from further study of determinants of this particular liquidity 
measure.  Consequently our final study is focussed on markets of Nigeria, BRVM, Ghana and 
then Cape Verde, though we only consider Liu and LOT zero returns measures in this latter 
market.  Finally there is significant evidence of considerable variation in liquidity across 
primary listed firms from outlying regions – both in BRVM as well as in Ghana and Nigeria.  
The evidence from Table 3 suggests that almost all trading activity in Ecobank within the 
Ghanaian market is concentrated on the locally registered affiliate, Ecobank (Ghana), with 
minimal activity in the parent holding entity, ETI.  In contrast the ETI parent holding entity 
has considerable trading activity in Nigeria with traded volume in ETI being almost one and a 
half times that of the market average.  This is likely reflective both of increased awareness of 
Ecobank brand alongside the impact of Ecobank’s recent acquisition of local Nigerian 
banking entity, Oceanic Bank thereby further increasing its market share and brand impact in 
Nigeria.  Finally there are marked differences between regional primary listed entities from 
across UMEAO nations on BRVM. 
Table 3 
 
5.2.  Liquidity determinants in BRVM 
The evidence from regression results in Table 4 reveals several differences in the relationships 
between bid-ask spread measure and its association with regional plus control variables on 
one hand and relationships between these and LOT proportion of zero returns and Liu 
indicators.  In line with earlier evidence from descriptive statistics the coefficients of both 
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Niger (0.030) and Senegal (0.031) are large, positive and statistically significant at 99% 
confidence level in their association with bid-ask spread.  Benin (0.020) and Burkina Faso 
(0.002) are lowest while a very large negative association (-0.111) that is also statistically 
significant at 99% confidence level exists between Togo and bid-ask spread. 
 In contrast the coefficients of association between each UMEAO regional nation and 
the two alternative measures of illiquidity, namely Liu and LOT proportion of zero returns 
indicators, are broadly similar.  All coefficients against regional UMEAO nations for their 
association with Liu and LOT zero measures are large, positive and statistically significant in 
excess of 95% confidence margin.  It is notable that the highest association between regional 
entity and both LOT zero and Liu measures is for Senegal (14.462 in LOT zero and 2.600 in 
Liu) and Burkina Faso (3.118 in LOT zero and 4.444 in Liu).  Togo also has a positive 
association with both illiquidity measures (3.432 in LOT zero and 1.900 in Liu).  This is the 
opposite of the association with illiquidity when using the bid-ask spread measure.  However 
a likely explanation for this opposite relationship when using bid-ask spread as opposed to 
other LOT zero and Liu measures is that given bid and ask prices are posted for reference 
only (i.e. are not quoted and thus not driving the market) that investors are more likely to 
make bids and offers that are closer to true call auction determined value of Togolese stock 
(ETI) given the significant presence of Ecobank and ETI in Cote d’Ivoire.  This in itself infers 
greater brand awareness and easier access to information thereby reducing informational 
asymmetries and hence posted bid-ask spreads.  The only major difference in associations 
between UMEAO regional nations and LOT zero and Liu illiquidity measures is in the case of 
Benin and Niger.  The relationship between Benin and LOT zero measure lacks statistical 
significance while Benin’s association with Liu is large, negative and statistically significant 
at 99% confidence margin.  This would imply that using the multidimensional trading speed 
measure of Liu (2006) primary listed firms with headquarters in Benin are associated with 
lower illiquidity.  This may be explained by the substantial presence of Bank of Africa group 
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entities in Cotonou, Benin with a listed Bank of Africa affiliate but also with the headquarters 
of Actibourse and ATTICA, the investment banking and private equity arms of Bank of 
Africa group that are also active in Cote d’Ivoire.  This would imply a significant degree of 
financial integration between Benin and local investment community in Abidjan, Cote 
d’Ivoire where BRVM is located.  Finally the large, positive and statistically significant 
association between Niger (-2.895) and LOT zero measure is in contrast to both bid-ask 
spread and Liu measures.  This relationship is unexpected and somewhat harder to explain but 
one plausible explanation would relate to the sole Nigerien listing being the local affiliate of 
Bank of Africa group which is a highly visible brand across UMEAO countries and therefore 
subject to high investor awareness and therefore decreased illiquidity. 
 In terms of the controls and the coefficient of association between civil war dummy 
and bid-ask spread is negative (-0.012) and statistically significant at 99% confidence level 
while it is positive and statistically significantly associated with LOT zero (+1.547) and Liu 
(+0.283) measures.  The most likely explanation for this visibly different association between 
bid-ask spread and other measures is similar to the above explanation for similar difference in 
signs attributed to Togo regional entity.  During the civil war and when BRVM was 
temporarily relocated in relative stability of Bamako, Mali any bid and offer prices to market 
are more likely to reflect true call-auction determined value of stocks.  However this 
explanation is only valid given the bid and ask prices are representative and not quoted.  
Finally all other firm governance controls have the expected size and direction of coefficients 
of association and are in line with literature (Hearn and Piesse, 2013).  As such the 
involvement of state, foreign partners and foreign venture capitalists are all positively 
associated with illiquidity while firms that are part of extended business group networks are 
negatively associated with illiquidity.  In line with Stoll (2000) as well as Lesmond (2005) 
and Hearn and Piesse (2013) stock price, volatility, traded volume and size (market 
capitalization) are all negatively associated with illiquidity. 
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Table 4 
 
5.3.  Liquidity determinants in Ghana, Nigeria and Cape Verde 
The evidence regarding the attraction of primary listed firms from other West African nations 
to Ghanaian and Nigerian exchanges is provided in Table 5.  While there are some differences 
in direction of coefficient of association between Togo (sole primary listed entity of ETI or 
Ecobank) and all three illiquidity measures generally the association is negative.  This 
generally negative association is likely explained in terms of brand awareness (familiarity of 
local investors with brand) and relative financial integration with Ecobank having sizeable 
presence in Ghana through its local affiliate, Ecobank (Ghana), and in Nigeria through its 
acquisition and re-branding of Nigeria’s Oceanic bank.  It is notable that the questionable 
accuracy of bid-ask data from Nigeria is further reflected in extremely low explanatory power 
of empirical model with bid-ask spread as dependent variable (an adjusted R2 of a meagre 
9%). 
 More generally across the firm governance controls and foreign partner, retained 
presence of entrepreneurial founder, involvement within extended family network or business 
group and participation of foreign venture capitalist are all associated with lower illiquidity in 
both Ghana and Nigeria.  In contrast state participation is associated with lower illiquidity in 
Ghana and the opposite effect in Nigeria while there is some discrepancy in this latter market 
over the impact on either LOT zero or Liu illiquidity measures by domestic venture capitalists.  
In particular domestic venture capitalists are associated with higher illiquidity using LOT zero 
measure and the opposite effect when using Liu indicator.  It is notable that in direct contract 
to the evidence of association between foreign venture capitalist participation in firms and 
illiquidity in both Nigeria and Ghana, the association in Cape Verde is large, positive and 
statistically significant.  This would infer that the presence of Geocapital private equity entity 
is associated with increased informational asymmetry and thus illiquidity. 
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 Finally all Stoll defined market controls have relationships with illiquidity measures as 
anticipated in literature (Lesmond (2005) and Hearn and Piesse (2013)).  As such stock price, 
volatility, traded volume and size (market capitalization) are all negatively associated with 
illiquidity.  The only exception is in Cape Verde where size has a positive association with 
LOT zero (0.173) and Liu (0.520) measures.  This would infer that larger firms are more 
opaque and have greater informational asymmetry in Cape Verde which is harder to explain 
and may be a nuance of a very small and extremely inactive market. 
Table 5 
 
6.  Conclusions 
This study uses three low-frequency liquidity estimators, namely the bid-ask spread, LOT 
(1999) proportion of daily zero returns and multidimensional Liu (2006) indicator, to assess 
the impact on liquidity-based transactions costs arising from the attraction of primary listings 
on centralized stock exchange from more distant regions and nations. 
 We find substantial support that the attraction of foreign or more distant regional 
primary listings is associated with increased illiquidity of firms from these more distant 
outlying regions.  However this increase in illiquidity is mitigated to a certain extent by 
increased brand awareness of those firms with primary listing on central market.  We also find 
substantial support that the impact of civil war on asymmetric information is considerable and 
reflected in elevated illiquidity.  These findings have the potential to better inform policy 
debates on the creation of integrated or regional stock exchanges in developing regions such 
as Africa where a significant shortcoming is the considerable differential in liquidity-based 
transactions costs arising from listings from more distant regions. 
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Table 1.  Micro-market characteristics: Cape Verde Islands Stock Exchange, 2012 
Panel 1: Equities Date Listed/ Maturity M. Cap. Free 
Float 
Total 
consummated 
buy orders 
Total 
consummated 
sell orders 
Mean Order 
matching 
time 
  US$m % US$m N US$m N Days 
Banco Comercial do Atlântico 12/2005 11.49 52.82 0.09 17 0.07 12 4.68 
Caixa Económica de Cabo Verde 12/2005 4.00 90.00 0.13 4 0.13 4 0.73 
Empresa Nacional de Combustivo 03/2007 5.74 35.00 0.03 8 0.04 13 5.57 
Sociedade Cabo-verdiana de Tabacos 11/2005 2.76 36.00 0.08 7 0.08 5 1.81 
Total:  23.99  0.32  0.31   
 
        
Panel 2: Corporate Bonds         
ASA (Empresa Nacional de Aeroportos e Segurança Aérea) 08/2007 – 08/2012 6.89 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Banco Africano de Investimentos Cabo Verde (Angola) 12/2011 – 12/2016  -- -- 2.23 2 2.23 2 24.54 
Banco Comercial do Atlântico 05/2010 – 05/2017 5.74 -- -- 0.87 2 0.82 1 2.00 
Banco Interatlântico 07/2008 – 07/2014 5.74 -- -- 0.00 0 0.03 1 -- -- 
Cape Verde Fast Ferry 08/2011 – 08/2015 17.23 -- -- 19.40 4 18.37 3 0.93 
Obrigações Elec A (Empresa Nacional de Electricidade e Agua) 06/2007 - 06/2012 13.12 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Obrigações Elec B 06/2007 - 06/2017 13.10 -- -- 0.44 1 0.44 1 0.00 
Obrigações Elec VAR 06/2007 - 06/2027 26.08 -- -- 203.15 1 203.15 1 0.00 
Obrigações A Tecnicil (Sociedade de Imobiliária e Construções) 08/2007 - 08/2012 4.02 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Obrigações B Tecnicil 08/2007 - 08/2012 2.29 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Obrigações C Tecnicil 08/2007 - 08/2012 2.29 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Obrigações D Tecnicil   -- -- 148.49 4 148.40 4 0.00 
Obrigações Tecnicil Idustria 04/2009 - 04/2014 1.72 -- -- 0.14 1 0.13 1 16.00 
Obrigações IFHA Max (Investment Fund for Health in Africa) 01/2009 - 01/2014 4.83 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Obrigações IFHA   -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
SOGEI (Sociedade de Gestão de Investimentos) 02/2009 - 02/2014 17.24 -- -- 1.89 1 1.89 1 0.00 
Total:  120.29  376.64  375.47   
 
        
Panel 3: Municipal (State) Bonds         
Obrigações da Câmara Municipal Praia 06/2010 – 06/2030 5.17 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Obrigações Câmara Municipal do Sal 06/2010 – 06/2025 2.29 -- -- 0.00 0 0.00 0 -- -- 
Total:  7.46  0.00  0.00   
         
Panel 4: Central Government Treasury Bonds         
Total: 11 Treasury Bonds Min: 11/2001 – Max: 09/2013 17.41 -- --      
Source: Compiled by author from Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde (Cape Verde stock exchange) website 
Notes: N is absolute number of consummated/ matched orders 
 Data unavailable for trading history of central government treasury bonds from either stock exchange nor bourse website 
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Table 2.  West African business environment 
Average firm governance characteristics for all listed firms on every stock market in West Africa.  The firm governance 
measures are dummy variables taking value 1 if condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise for involvement of state, foreign 
partner, owner-founder retained on board, whether firm is part of extended family group/ business network and whether 
participation of domestic as opposed to foreign venture capitalists (VC).  Degree of family group/ business network 
influence throughout stock market measured as number of firms under control of group/network and proportions of total 
market capitalization (US$m) and total traded value (US$m) cumulatively attributable to top 1, top 2, top 5, top 10 and then 
all family groups/ business networks operating in national market.  Data are from annual reports on AfricanFinancials 
(http://www.africanfinancials.com) or from websites of individual firms, stock exchanges and national regulatory 
authorities. 
Panel 1 No. 
Family/ 
Business 
group 
firms 
No. 
Family/ 
Business 
groups 
Mkt. Cap. 
USD (m) 
Proportion of total Mkt. Cap. per family/ business group (%) 
   Total Top 1 Top 2 Top 5 Top 10 All 
Nigeria 35 28 41,988.19 28.35 34.80 41.65 42.29 42.56 
BVRM 0 0 4,740.47 1.89 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ghana 3 3 14,060.68 0.31 0.35 -- -- -- -- 0.35 
Cameroon 2 3 213.11 64.98 95.29 -- -- -- -- 100.00 
Cape Verde 1 1 100.28 45.31 -- -- -- -- -- -- 45.31 
Sierra Leone 0 0 19.08 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
         
Panel 2   Traded Value 
USD (m) 
Proportion of total Traded value per family/ business group 
(%) 
   Total Top 1 Top 2 Top 5 Top 10 All 
Nigeria   1,952.86 14.21 23.94 28.21 28.45 28.49 
BVRM   37.48 4.77 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ghana   22.56 16.17 16.71 -- -- -- -- 16.72 
Cameroon   0.97 88.56 97.85 -- -- -- -- 100.00 
Cape Verde   0.11 32.89 -- -- -- -- -- -- 32.89 
Sierra Leone   0.09 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
         
   Proportions of listed firms with involvement of following entities (%) 
Panel 3   State Foreign 
Partner 
Owner/ 
Founder 
Family/ Bus. 
Group 
VC 
Domestic 
VC 
Foreign 
         
Nigeria   7.14 24.18 24.18 23.08 4.95 2.75 
BVRM   27.66 76.60 0.00 8.51 0.00 14.89 
Ghana   20.45 52.27 13.64 6.82 0.00 2.27 
Cameroon   66.67 66.67 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
Cape Verde   100.00 50.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 25.00 
Sierra Leone   100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Compiled by authors from Bloomberg, Datastream and National stock exchanges 
(1) US$ Exchange rates from Bloomberg and Datastream 
 (2) Ghana prices denominated in (old) Ghanaian cedi. The new cedi was introduced on 1 January 2007 
 and is 1/10,000 value of (old) cedi 
(3) Single largest family group in Cameroon is one foreign (Luxembourg-based) family. 
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Table 3.  West African equity market summary statistics 
Descriptive statistics for 20 SSA equity markets including the 12 that comprise the final sample.  Start dates vary for each country while sample end dates are June 2012 across 
all markets.  N is sample size.  Price is the mean daily price for each month and converted to US$ using the mean exchange rate for each month and country.  Volume is the mean 
of the daily trading volume for each month in thousands.  Market capitalization is of 1 January for each country and is equity market value for each firm in millions of local 
currency or US$.  The bid-ask spread is defined in Table 3.  The monthly mean is for all stocks to obtain a market wide measure.  The US$ market capitalization is the end of 
month exchange rate for each country and month.  Square parentheses indicate median values for each variable. 
    Local market   US$ equivalent  
Market Regional listed firm(s) Sample 
Start 
N Bid-Ask 
spread (%) 
Zero Return 
(%) 
Volume (‘000) Price Mkt. Cap (m) 
Cameroon Overall 09/ 2011 3 Call Auction 93.84 [96.30] 0.46 [0.20] 144.33 [105.95] 65.53 [43.87] 
Cape Verde Is. Overall 12/ 2005 4 -- -- 97.49 [98.39] 0.64 [0.15] 59.67 [66.76] 18.12 [19.08] 
Sierra Leone Overall 01/2009 1 -- -- 98.92 [100.00] 3,603.03 [1,582.82] 0.001 [0.00] 20.95 [20.26] 
         
Ghana Overall 07/2007 42 14.23 [3.44] 91.79 [100.00] 661.90 [65.87] 3.05 [0.30] 370.82 [33.02] 
 Gambia – Trust Bank 07/2007  0.00 [0.00] 99.86 [100.00] 0.85 [0.85] 1.19 [1.33] 35.80 [39.90] 
 Togo - Ecobank 03/2008  1.82 [1.03] 68.51 [76.67] 172.88 [88.46] 3.12 [3.11] 510.17 [488.75] 
 Togo - ETI 07/2007  13.43 [6.98] 87.76 [87.10] 0.01 [0.00] 0.44 [0.16] 598.29 [209.01] 
         
Nigeria Overall 10/2009 201 1.80 [0.90] 81.61 [96.72] 45,285.59 [5,268.14] 0.28 [0.02] 213.52 [18.65] 
 Togo - ETI 10/2009  1.78 [1.78] 50.54 [46.67] 73,387.85 [57,479.45] 0.09 [0.10] 938.32 [979.34] 
         
BRVM Overall 09/1998 47 6.67 [3.23] 90.48 [95.46] 24.00 [0.32] 50.37 [23.59] 74.12 [15.56] 
 Senegal – Sonatel 11/1998  4.54 [3.64] 67.66 [67.96] 23.69 [13.80] 152.69 [94.99] 1,526.93 [949.93] 
 Burkina Faso – Onatel 05/2009  0.56 [0.00] 89.36 [93.33] 1.06 [0.69] 96.40 [100.06] 327.77 [340.23] 
 Burkina Faso – Bank of Africa 01/2011  0.49 [0.28] 84.89 [86.67] 3.18 [0.83] 68.90 [70.18] 48.23 [49.12] 
 Niger – Bank of Africa 12/2003  3.35 [3.17] 92.08 [96.16] 0.66 [0.26] 60.63 [59.87] 11.82 [11.67] 
 Benin – Bank of Africa 11/2000  1.96 [1.13] 88.14 [90.91] 1.29 [0.76] 77.63 [74.85] 50.19 [52.02] 
 Cote d’Ivoire – Bank of Africa* 06/2010  0.83 [0.83] 86.80 [90.00] 2.48 [1.03] 59.43 [59.12] 35.66 [35.47] 
 Togo – ETI 09/2006  1.84 [1.68] 66.46 [66.67] 1,592.49 [1,137.44] 0.55 [0.11] 92.40 [23.33] 
Source: Compiled by authors from Bloomberg, Datastream and National stock exchanges 
Notes: (1) US$ Exchange rates from Bloomberg and Datastream 
 (2) Ghana prices denominated in (old) Ghanaian cedi. The new cedi was introduced on 1 January 2007 and is 1/10,000 value of (old) cedi 
 (3) *indicates Ivorian Bank of Africa is present for comparison purposes against other regional Bank of Africa listings 
 (4) ETI refers to Ecobank Transnational Industries, the parent MNE entity of locally headquartered Ecobank entities 
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Table 4  Results of regressions of total costs on liquidity proxies and measures for BRVM regional market 
Regressions are on a firm-monthly basis.  Three liquidity measurement variables are presented.  Liu (2006) , turnover is a ratio of the traded volume of shares in relation to total 
number of shares outstanding and is scaled by the number of trading days in the month of measurement.  It provides a measure of trading frequency.  The final measure is the Bid 
Ask spread which is the average daily relative bid ask spread over the prior 1 month, where daily relative spread is the local currency denominated spread divided by average of 
Bid and Ask prices.  Firm size is determined from the first day of each month.  Volatility is the average daily stock return variance and price and volume measure the average 
price (local currency units) and trading volume over an annual trading period.  Turnover, price, volume, and market capitalisation are all log scaled in line with Stoll (2000).  N is 
the sample size in firm months.  The White cross-section t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 BRVM (N = 3,643)   
Dependent Variable: Bid-Ask spread (%) Zero (%) Liu 
 Aggregate Specific Aggregate Specific Aggregate Specific 
Intercept 0.252 [8.57] † 0.244 [8.29] † 144.048 [49.25] † 146.469 [48.31] † 28.825 [20.86] † 27.276 [20.98] † 
Regional Listings       
Aggregate -0.077 [-8.04] † -- -- 1.829 [0.86] -- -- 1.445 [1.99] ** -- -- 
Senegal  0.031 [6.42] †  14.462 [5.62] †  2.600 [2.90] † 
Benin  0.020 [8.86] †  1.051 [0.77]   -3.022 [-8.76] † 
Niger  0.030 [4.84] †  -2.895 [-2.33] †  1.729 [4.03] † 
Burkina Faso  0.002 [1.60]*  3.118 [5.68] †  4.444 [5.72] † 
Togo  -0.111 [-9.98] †  3.432 [1.28]*  1.900 [1.85]** 
Gambia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Institutional Control       
Civil War -0.012 [-3.89] † -0.010 [-3.30] † 1.245 [4.13] † 1.547 [4.91] † 0.244 [0.88] 0.283 [1.01] 
Governance Controls       
State 0.041 [7.03] † 0.038 [6.81] † -0.106 [-0.21] 0.124 [0.26] 0.630 [1.91]** 0.624 [1.87]** 
Foreign Partner 0.027 [7.21] † 0.027 [7.20] † 0.456 [1.16] 0.510 [1.30]* 0.831 [3.27] † 0.798 [3.12] † 
Founder -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Family/ Bus. Group 0.055 [5.81] † -0.045 [-8.76] † -2.253 [-1.01] -0.353 [-0.32] -9.071 [-10.61] † -6.535 [-14.96] † 
Domestic VC -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Foreign VC -0.013 [-2.43] † -0.008 [-1.55]* 3.012 [4.35] † 2.972 [4.39] † 1.052 [3.07] † 0.900 [2.70] † 
Market Controls       
Price -0.015 [-9.06] † -0.017 [-9.77] † -0.482 [-2.24]** -0.339 [-1.42]* -1.610 [-11.30] † -1.578 [-11.81] † 
Volatility -0.012 [-0.59] -0.014 [-0.76] -42.039 [-1.42]* -42.063 [-1.43]* -1.063 [-1.19] -1.063 [-1.17] 
Volume -0.0003 [-0.30] 3.58E-05 [0.04] -2.516 [-26.10] † -2.605 [-26.08] † -2.602 [-13.81] † -2.565 [-13.32] † 
Size -0.004 [-2.26] ** -0.003 [-1.53]* -1.640 [-12.00] † -1.796 [-11.93] † 0.789 [5.77] † 0.836 [6.55] † 
       
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat (p) 27.73 [0.00] 24.00 [0.00] 127.72 [0.00] 105.90 [0.00] 202.71 [0.00] 169.13 [0.00] 
Adj-R2 (%) 0.1109 0.1171 0.3717 0.3769 0.4849 0.4922 
Notes: (1) * p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level 
 (2) White cross section robust standard errors and covariances (d.f. corrected) (period clustering) 
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Table 5  Results of regressions of total costs on liquidity proxies and measures for West Africa (excluding BRVM) 
Regressions are on a firm-monthly basis.  Three liquidity measurement variables are presented.  Liu (2006) , turnover is a ratio of the traded volume of shares in relation to total 
number of shares outstanding and is scaled by the number of trading days in the month of measurement.  It provides a measure of trading frequency.  The final measure is the Bid 
Ask spread which is the average daily relative bid ask spread over the prior 1 month, where daily relative spread is the local currency denominated spread divided by average of 
Bid and Ask prices.  Firm size is determined from the first day of each month.  Volatility is the average daily stock return variance and price and volume measure the average 
price (local currency units) and trading volume over an annual trading period.  Turnover, price, volume, and market capitalisation are all log scaled in line with Stoll (2000).  N is 
the sample size in firm months.  The White cross-section t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 Ghana (N = 731) Nigeria (N = 1,935) Cape Verde Islands (N = 117) 
Dependent Variable: Bid-Ask spread 
(%) 
Zero (%) Liu Bid-Ask spread 
(%) 
Zero (%) Liu Zero (%) Liu 
Intercept 0.476 [2.11]** 157.004 [12.44] † 5.881 [0.50] 0.178 [2.66] † 228.614 [27.88] † 20.793 [10.02] † 115.045 [5.91] † 29.535 [5.18] † 
Regional Listings         
Aggregate -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Senegal -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Benin -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Niger -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Burkina Faso -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Togo -0.021 [-1.28]* 0.287 [0.14] -4.375 [-4.10] † 0.006 [3.98] † -3.251 [-2.14]** 0.288 [1.70]** -- -- -- -- 
Gambia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Institutional Control         
Civil War -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Governance Controls         
State -0.092 [-2.36] † 13.451 [6.50] † -1.566 [-2.35] † 0.001 [0.54] 2.308 [1.35]* 0.926 [3.56] † -- -- -- -- 
Foreign Partner -0.043 [-1.28]* 9.861 [5.73] † -0.526 [-0.74] 0.0004 [0.26] -1.285 [-1.63]* -0.947 [-4.50] † -- -- -- -- 
Founder -0.099 [-2.20]** -2.043 [-0.70] -0.539 [-0.53] 0.001 [0.91] -1.676 [-1.84]** 0.225 [1.57]* -- -- -- -- 
Family/ Bus. Group -0.063 [-1.94]** 2.158 [1.42]* 1.450 [1.29]* 0.001 [0.58] -0.470 [-0.69] -0.335 [-1.69]** -- -- -- -- 
Domestic VC -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.001 [-0.21] 4.297 [4.42] † -0.828 [-3.01] † -- -- -- -- 
Foreign VC -0.124 [-3.26] † -8.114 [-5.16] † -2.018 [-1.29]* 0.004 [0.95] -4.903 [-3.88] † 0.856 [2.58] † 2.432 [3.16] † 0.427 [1.33]* 
Market Controls         
Price 0.015 [0.99] 0.233 [0.41] -2.999 [-3.89] † 0.005 [1.41]* 1.615 [2.04]** -0.481 [-5.74] † -2.092 [-1.05] -1.999 [-2.90] † 
Volatility 2.765 [4.86] † -31.299 [-1.28]* 5.020 [0.42] 0.325 [1.62]* -618.433 [-2.14]** -9.075 [-0.38] -83.586 [-1.72]** -4.296 [-0.47] 
Volume 0.010 [1.77]** -1.806 [-10.38] † -3.136 [-6.54] † -0.003 [-4.40] † -6.322 [-11.29] † -1.211 [-10.38] † -1.201 [-3.76] † -0.724 [-6.09] † 
Size -0.022 [-1.53]* -2.127 [-3.78] † 2.715 [3.03] † -0.006 [-1.87]** -2.218 [-3.93] † 0.364 [3.57] † 0.173 [0.31] 0.520 [3.23] 
         
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-stat (p) 11.17 [0.00] 23.81 [0.00] 62.30 [0.00] 10.47 [0.00] 198.48 [0.00] 65.25 [0.00] 8.28 [0.00] 20.27 [0.00] 
Adj-R2 (%) 0.1823 0.3333 0.5733 0.0932 0.6819 0.4109 0.3053 0.5377 
Notes: (1) * p > 90% level; ** p > 95% level; † p > 99% level 
 (2) White cross section robust standard errors and covariances (d.f. corrected) (period clustering) 
 (3) Note that the total lack of trading (reflected in zero volumes for much of sample period) has caused the omission of Gambia’s Trust Bank and Togolese ETI entity 
from Ghanaian sample.  As such the only Togolese entity in Ghanaian sample is the locally incorporated Ecobank subsidiary. 
(4) Quoted bid and ask prices are unavailable from Cape Verde exchange 
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Figure 1. Extent of control of Bank of Africa business group, 2011 
 
Notes: (1) * PROPARCO; ** Netherlands FMO; *** AGORA; † Belgian BIO; †† ATTICA
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Figure 2. Extent of expansion of Bank of Africa business group in contrast to Ecobank, 2012 
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Appendix Table 1  Institutional differences across West Africa’s equity markets 
 
Legal origin Economic 
system 
No. 
Listed 
Firms 
No. stock 
brokers 
Corporate Governance Legal Framework Accounting and Auditing standards 
Cape Verde 
Islands 
Portuguese 
Civil Code 
Bank-based 4 3 National corporate governance code currently being 
drafted (before ratification in parliament) 
Accounting standard regulators of the Bank of Cape Verde 
(BCV) has recommended the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting standards (IFRS) in 2008, but to date 
this has not been effected 
BRVM French Civil 
Code 
Dirigiste 
model 
47 9 in Cote 
d’Ivoire; 4 in 
Benin; 3 in 
Senegal; 1 in 
all other 
UMEAO 
countries 
The Union Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest (UEMOA) zone has adopted the OHADA 
legal framework (Organization for Harmonization of 
Business Laws in Africa). The main statute that 
governs companies is the Uniform OHADA Act on 
company law (Acte Uniforme de OHADA relatif au 
droit des sociétés commerciales et du Groupement 
d’intérêt économique), adopted in 1997.  UEMOA 
countries share a common securities regulator (Le 
Conseil Régional de l'Epargne Publique et des 
Marchés Financiers) and stock exchange (the 
BRVM) 
The Conseil National de la Comptabilité (CNC) is 
responsible for formulating accounting standards in Cote 
d’Ivoire.  Its responsibility is to adopt the accounting 
standards designed by the Conseil Comptable Ouest Africain 
(CCOA).  All entities in Cote d'Ivoire (except for financial 
institutions) were required to prepare their financial 
statements in accordance with Système Comptable Ouest 
Africain (SYSCOA).  However owing to relatively recent 
establishment of CCOA, the CNC-OHADA has been 
adopted in Cote D'Ivoire. Although CNC is trying to 
converge OHADA with IFRS, the two types of accounting 
standards are still quite different 
Cameroon French Civil 
Code 
Dirigiste 
model 
3 3 As for BRVM and UMEAO countries.  Specific to 
Cameroon is the Règlement Général de la 
Commission des Marchés Financiers (CMF). 
Accounting standard regulators in Cameroon are considering 
in adopting IFRS in early 2009 (IMF, 2009). However, up 
until 2009 accounting standards solely follow the OHADA 
framework 
Sierra Leone Common 
Law 
Market-
orientated 
1 3 The Companies Act (2009); National corporate 
governance code not yet drafted; Sierra Leone stock 
exchange operations and regulation governed by the 
Interim Stock Trading Rules and Regulations (not 
ratified in parliament) 
Sierra Leone has adopted IFRS for all firms (incl. unlisted). 
However by 2009 only one firm (Access Bank) has 
successfully adopted these 
Ghana Common 
Law 
Market-
orientated 
42 16 Companies Code (1963), Securities Industry Law 
(1993) and the Regulations of the Ghana Stock 
Exchange; Investment Promotion Centre Act (1994) 
Ghana has adopted IFRS, in place of National Accounting 
Standards, as of January 2007, for all listed companies, 
SOEs, finance entities and public utilities. 
Nigeria Common 
Law 
Market-
orientated 
201 219 Companies and Allied Matters Act (1990); Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions Act (1991); Investments 
and Securities Act (1999); Securities and Exchange 
Commission Act (1988); Voluntary code of Best 
Practice for Public Companies (established by SEC, 
2008) 
Nigeria has a bifurcated system of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) alongside local indigenous Nigerian 
Accounting Standards.  However only 40% of Nigerian 
firms have adopted formal corporate governance measures 
(CBN, 2006) 
 
